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A B S T R AC T
The aim of this study is to explore the concept of legacy in mega sporting events. More precisely, 
it examines how one of the smallest cities to host the Olympic Winter Games, Lillehammer in 1994, 
more than 25 years after the Games, has a rather positive legacy of the investments in sporting fa-
cilities, opposite to a majority among the hosts of the Winter Games. The research, which entailed 
qualitative documentary analysis (e.g. bidding documents, government guarantees, propositions 
and minutes of meetings in the Parliament, supplemented with interviews), shows how the concept 
was changed after Lillehammer was awarded the event in 1988. Lillehammer went from an extreme 
compact Games model to place the venues in five municipalities. Also important was the establish-
ment of government funding to maintain the different arenas. For many hosts of mega/major events, 
sport facilities end up with a negative legacy because of poor or insufficient planning. Today, the 
‘after-use fund’ has been depleted, which is challenging for Lillehammer because several municipali-
ties in the Olympic region are also responsible for the funding. It remains to be seen if the positive 
legacy will remain positive in the years to come.
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Introduction
At the closing ceremony of the 1994 Olympic Winter Games in 
Lillehammer, Norway, the president of the International Olympic 
Committee (IOC), Juan Antonio Samaranch, announced that Lille-
hammer had been ‘the best Olympic Winter Games ever’ (Hauger-
ud, 2015). Later, Samaranch said: ‘We never before had seen the 
participation of the population in the Olympic Games like we saw 
in Norway. Never. To have the Games in such a small city!’1 Michael 
Payne, an IOC director between 1988 and 2005, claimed that Lille-
hammer turned the spectators into part of the spectacle. ‘This and 
the overall look of the Games exceeded everyone’s expectations’ 
(Payne, 2005, p. 172). The impression of successful Games reached 
outside the IOC headquarters in Lausanne, Switzerland. Sports 
 Illustrated stated: ‘These were the fairy-tale Games, drawn from the 
imagination, staged in the pages of a children’s book. They could 
not exist. Reality cannot be this good’ (Montville, 1994, p. 90). 
Why do the Lillehammer Games have such a positive image? Is the 
impression the same more than 25 years later? Did the organizer, 
unlike most Olympic hosts, manage to plan in such a good way 
that the legacy is essentially positive, or is this a matter of coin-
1 Interview with one of the authors in Barcelona, June 15, 2005. 
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cidences? Insight into the legacy of Lillehammer is poor because 
hardly any papers have been published on the topic (Scheu, Pre-
uss, & Könecke, 2019). This paper will fill some gaps.
The point of departure is Preuss’ definition of legacy: ‘Irrespective 
of the time of production and space, legacy is all planned and un-
planned, positive and negative, tangible and intangible structures 
created for and by a sport event that remain longer than the event 
itself’ (Preuss, 2007, p. 211). It has been a challenge for bidding cit-
ies to include many long-term effects of the Olympics that they 
scarcely believe themselves and are not working purposefully to 
fulfil. The organising committee disbands within two years after 
the event (Leopkey & Parent, 2017), and it can be reduced to an 
academic activity to discuss positive or negative outcomes of dif-
ferent Olympic Games. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to 
provide a long-term perspective on the 1994 Lillehammer Olympic 
Winter Games to also shed light on how legacies can develop over 
time. We conduct a comparison between what was promised in 
the application and what remains a quarter of a century later. We 
limit ourselves to sports facilities, an area of Olympic projects that 
seems to give the host region big challenges after the event. For 
example, Scheu et al. (2019) identified five ‘winter cities’ to which a 
rather negative sporting legacy was attributed, i.e. venues built for 
the Games remained empty or underused after the Games (Sochi 
2014, Torino 2006, Nagano 1998, Sarajevo 1984 [venues also de-
stroyed by the war] and Grenoble 1968).
With the 1994 Olympic Winter Games in Lillehammer as the case, 
the research question of this study is: How did Lillehammer pre-
pare for a positive legacy of huge investments in sporting facilities 
for Olympic Winter Games in 1994? By increasing the understand-
ing of an Olympic event in the 1990s, we fill gaps in the legacy liter-
ature. First, as pointed out by Thomson et al. (2019), legacy analysis 
has been done within a relatively short timeframe around the actu-
al events. In their mapping of legacy literature, Bocarro, Byers, and 
Carter (2018) found that timeframes used to capture legacy rarely 
exceeded five years, which is in line with Scheu et al. (2019), who 
found in their review that the average time of post-Games data 
collection was two years after the event. Given that it takes 15-30 
years to gain insight into the true legacy of an event (Gratton & Pre-
uss, 2008; Parent & Smith-Swan, 2013), neither the 2010 FIFA World 
Cup in South Africa nor the 2012 Olympic Games in London (two 
events that have dominated the legacy literature) are suitable for 
retrospective studies. Koenigstorfer and colleagues (2019) stated 
that the ‘…length of time that legacy is assessed must be extended 
to years after the event to ascertain the longevity of legacies and 
weaknesses in legacy production over time’ (p. 14).
Second, most event studies have been carried out on the Olym-
pic Summer Games (Dickson, Benson, & Blackman, 2011). More 
knowledge about the Winter Games is of importance because the 
investment in facilities is huge for areas that historically have been 
smaller than host cities for the summer Games. Such investment 
can pose special problems for hosts based in smaller communities 
(Essex & Chalkley, 2004), who do not necessarily have the capacity 
to fund, digest and absorb major new developments or transport 
networks. Popa (2018) raises legacy to a more challenging stan-
dard for Winter Olympic Games than their Summer counterparts. 
This can be one reason for a decline in communities willing to host 
mega-events. The 2022 Winter Olympics turned into the ‘Games 
that no one seems to want’ (Associated Press, 2014) after Munich, 
Oslo, Stockholm, St. Moritz/Davos, Krakow, and Lviv refrained from 
submitting bids or withdrew them (Müller, 2015). More knowledge 
about legacies of the winter edition of the Games may give some 
answers. This paper is a contribution to fill this gap.
The paper proceeds as follows: First, a short overview of the 1994 
Lillehammer Games is presented. Then the concept of legacy is ex-
plained. Then we present our findings and discussion, and some 
concluding remarks.  
The Lillehammer context
In the early 1980s, the Norwegian government believed that the 
long-term outlook for business and jobs development in the in-
land districts was unpromising. The regions of Hedmark and Op-
pland (then 2 of 19 counties in Norway) were in the shadows of the 
increasingly attractive oil industry on the country’s west coast. In 
August 1981, a committee (the Inland Committee) was appointed 
to look into what could be done to promote business and secure 
jobs in the inland districts. The Inland Committee stated that there 
was a need for ‘special incentives’ in the region (NOU, 1983: 21). 
At the same time, the idea of an Olympic event was seen as such 
an initiative, because it could stimulate the existing businesses, 
adding new expertise and new industries to the region. The Par-
liament’s justification for giving a state guarantee was that it ex-
pected long-term outcomes, such as an increase in tourism, more 
jobs, better infrastructure and sport facilities [Hanstad, 1991; Lesjø, 
2003; St. prp. nr. 85 (1984-1985)]2.
The Lillehammer Games came about at a time when legacy-ori-
ented planning was not yet institutionalised in the Olympic move-
ment. Still, the thinking about post-Olympic use was an important 
background behind the initiative. Lillehammer promoted its bid-
ding campaign under the slogan “Compact Games” to comply with 
the IOC’s priorities at the time. Its campaign for the 1992 Winter 
Games resulted in a loss to the candidature of Albertville at the IOC 
session in Lausanne in October 1986. At the same session, another 
decision of considerable importance for Lillehammer was taken: 
the Olympic cycle for the Olympic Winter Games, which had fol-
lowed the summer Olympics since 1924, was now changed to take 
place halfway into the period of the Olympiad (the four years be-
tween each edition of the Summer Games). This shift mainly came 
about for commercial reasons, as an initiative from TV companies 
convinced president Samaranch that the revenue from the Games 
would be larger if the Summer Games and Winter Games were split 
up (Payne, 2005, pp. 41-43). The next Winter Games was then set 
up to be delivered only two years after the 1992 Games. This gave 
the Lillehammer campaign a ‘flying start’, and the IOC awarded the 
city the 1994 Games in September 1988. Lillehammer then had the 
advantage of being the first Games to be the only Olympic event in 
2 St. prp. is in English Proposition to the Parliament.
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the new Olympic calendar for the year 1994. The preparation for 
the Games took place at a time of international turmoil and was 
influenced by the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a number of 
new nations aspiring to enter the Olympic movement, and the 
Yugoslav Wars. 
Chappelet (2002) has pointed out the challenge of the large 
growth of the Olympic Winter Games between 1980 and 2002. 
Although the Winter Games was born in small mountain resorts, 
its development into a mega-event has increasingly resembled 
that of the Summer Games, and the opportunity to host the 
event has likewise been rewarded to large cities (e.g. Calgary, 
Nagano, Salt Lake City and Turin). By contrast, small sites such as 
Albertville in France’s Savoie region and Lillehammer have stood 
out as modern exceptions.  
The delivery of the Olympic Winter Games in 1994 as a success-
ful Games was a contribution to the Olympic movement and an 
intangible legacy of what a well-organized mega-event could 
demonstrate. Lillehammer’s delivery of the Games was due not 
only to the organizers but also to a combination of organization 
and good luck. Namely, Lillehammer experienced the longest 
period of stable high pressure with sunshine for the month the 
Olympics took place. The accumulated interest in winter sports 
among Norwegians and the tradition of cheering on national 
heroes as well as competitors from other nations were also 
important for the atmosphere. The compact location attracted 
people to events, as Chappelet (2008) argued as the advantage 
of small places and concentrated events. The small town and its 
neighbour municipalities were the sites, and the enthusiasm of 
the public that filled the Olympic venues created a special fes-
tival atmosphere. A sense of belongingness and communitas 
among the spectators, visitors and locals was created, similar to 
what other events have attained (Chalip, 2006; Hiller, 2012). 
Legacy as a concept and analytical framework
The word ‘legacy’ was first used in an Olympic document for the 
Games in Melbourne in 1956 (Leopkey & Parent, 2012), but it 
was not until the 2000s that the terms ‘legacy’ and ‘governance 
of legacy’ were introduced by the IOC. Since 2003, ‘legacy’ has 
been included in its Charter, which states that the IOC’s role is 
to promote a positive legacy from the Olympic Games to the 
host cities and host countries (IOC, 2013b, p. 17). All bidding cit-
ies have to present a plan for legacy, including the long-term 
benefits for the city, region and country. They must show how 
the bidding country can contribute to the development of the 
Olympic Movement and the Olympic Games (IOC, 2013a, p. 47). 
The IOC (2017) later developed a Legacy Strategic Approach 
with a roadmap for implementation and how legacy should be 
embedded in the lifecycle of the Games, from vision to the post-
game period. Leopkey and Parent (2017) presented four event 
legacy phases set against Parent’s (2008) event organization 
modes (in parenthesis): Legacy conceptualization (bid), legacy 
planning (planning and implementation phase), transfer/trans-
formation (wrap-up), and post-Game legacy.
Legacy is defined in a number of ways; see, for example, Thomson, 
Schlenker, and Schulenkorf (2013) for a summary of the defini-
tions. The definition presented by Preuss (2007) can be used as a 
point of departure for this essay. As mentioned previously, he de-
fined the term as ‘planned and unplanned, positive and negative, 
tangible and intangible structures created through a sport event 
that remain after the event’ (p. 211). Preuss has expanded his defi-
nition of legacy from 2007. In a recent publication (Preuss, 2019), 
he states that legacy is any outcome that affects people and/or 
space caused by structural changes that stem from the Olympic 
Games. For a practical application, he adds that this legacy can be 
translated as: 
(a)  people (or several stakeholders) are affected by and/or
(b)  the environment (city and nature) is affected by
(c)  changes (tangible or intangible) that are
(d)  caused by the Games (often developed indirectly by the Games). 
(e)  The outcome can be neutral, positive or negative. A negative 
legacy reminds us that outcomes may be unintentional (inten-
tion) (Preuss, 2019, p. 106). 
The literature distinguishes between the terms legacy, leverage 
and impact. Impacts are outcomes that are directly connected 
to the staging of the event (Gratton & Preuss, 2008). Leveraging 
means implementing measures to optimise desired event out-
comes (Chalip, 2004). Leverage includes the evaluation that takes 
into account the stages of event cycle: bidding, planning and im-
plementation of the event (Chalip, 2006). Taks, Chalip, and Green 
(2015) claim that a distinction between leverage and legacy is im-
portant. Legacy planning is concerned with the outcomes of an 
event that are rendered for the community, while leverage ‘focuses 
on the community and the ways that it can integrate each event 
into its marketing and management strategies’ (Taks et al., 2015, 
p. 1).
As an analytical framework, Chappelet (2006) distinguished the 
legacies as sporting, economic, infrastructural, urban, and so-
cial. Grix, Brannagan, Wood, and Wynne (2017) derived five often 
overlapping categories: economic, urban regeneration, national 
pride/feel-good factor, increased participation in physical activity 
and sport, international prestige, and ‘soft power’. In developing 
a new analytical framework for measuring legacy, Preuss (2019) 
emphasises that legacy is about structural changes that occur for 
and by the Games. According to him, legacy can be assigned to six 
facets: urban development, environmental enhancement, policy 
and governance, human development, intellectual property, and 
beliefs and behaviour. In our study urban development is under 
scrutiny, with emphasis on infrastructure/sporting facilities.
Review of literature
Compared to the Olympic Summer Games, only a small number of 
articles have been published related to the Winter Olympics (Dick-
son et al., 2011). Scheu et al. (2019) found that 18 per cent of the 
papers addressed the legacy of the Winter Games. Most of these 
studies have been on planning or expectation of legacies before 
the Games, or conducted within a short timeframe of the event. In 
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and Pinerolo remain underused, with very high maintenance and 
management costs. 
Methods
This paper is based on a single case study. Case studies are particu-
larly useful for exploratory studies trying to answer how and why 
something happens (Yin, 2014). As Denscombe (2017) argues:
The logic behind concentrating efforts on one case rather than 
many is that there may be insights to be gained from looking 
at the individual case that can have wider implications and, 
importantly, that would not have come to light through the 
use of a research strategy that tried to cover a large number of 
instances (p. 57-58). 
A benefit of case studies is their ability to incorporate a variety of 
different sources of evidence (Yin, 2014). The combination of meth-
ods enables us to analyse the topic more thoroughly than would 
have been possible by means of a single method (Silverman, 2001). 
In this study, research was mainly collected through documents 
and supplemented by interviews.  
The documents included reports/investigations at the local and 
national level (5), bidding documents from the Lillehammer mu-
nicipality and the Norwegian Olympic Committee to the Par-
liament and the IOC (4), application for state guarantees from 
Lillehammer municipality (3), propositions to the Parliament (8), 
minutes of meetings in the Parliament (4), Official Norwegian Re-
port (NOU) (4), and the final report from the Lillehammer Organiz-
ing Committee (1). 
To increase our understanding and insight, and to fill some gaps 
in the documents, in June 2020, we conducted one interview with 
two representatives involved in the bidding process and planning 
for the Games. Arne Myhrvold (born 1945), represented the Nor-
wegian Olympic Committee (NOC) as vice president (1986-1989) 
and president (1989-1999). From 1988 to 1994, he was vice presi-
dent of the Lillehammer Olympic Organizing Committee (LOOC). 
Hans B. Skaset (born 1935), was president of the Norwegian Con-
federation of Sports (NIF) from 1984 to 1990, and from 1991, he 
was Director-General in the Department of Sport (Ministry of 
Culture) and involved in the preparation from the government’s 
side. As NIF president, he was a member of the bidding committee 
(1987-1988). He was a member of the LOOC from 1988 until he re-
signed as NIF president in 1990. The interview with Myhrvold and 
Skaset, key persons in the phase when the Lillehammer  project 
transformed from bidding to preparation, made it possible to ask 
about topics that are not part of the official documents and to get 
more insight in the change of location of the sport venues. The bid-
ding process started in the early 1980s and was led by men in their 
50s and 60s. The two presidents of the NOC until 1988 (when Lille-
hammer was awarded the Games), and the head of the bidding 
committee (and the first president of the organizing committee) 
have passed away, while other key persons were not available due 
to health conditions. However, one of the authors interviewed all 
of them in 1990-91.3
the following, we narrow the review to facilities. While some longi-
tudinal studies of facilities exist, a majority of the papers are com-
mentary (Scheu et al., 2019). In this section, we will look at events 
that were held from 1988 to 2006, a period in which actual legacy 
is possible to assess.
Calgary 1988: Ritchie’s (2000) paper on Calgary 1988 emphasized 
that the city and its institutions (most notably the University of 
Calgary) were the beneficiaries of many physical facilities that re-
main as invaluable assets to city residents. Second, and perhaps 
the most prized, legacy of the Calgary Games was a financial en-
dowment fund containing sufficient financing to operate the fa-
cilities ‘in perpetuity’. Hiller (2006) states that the facilities built for 
the 1988 Olympics have had mixed residual value in promoting the 
city. The hosting of occasional World Cup ski jump competitions 
and the legacy of the buildings as visible landmarks and training 
sites are important but have limited value as marketing tools for 
the city.
Albertville 1992: Following a few adaptations, the facilities re-
mained true to their sporting vocation by continuing to host na-
tional and international events. They became quite attractive to 
tourists, apparently due to their Olympic image, and this helped 
them break even. The sport facilities were still working (apart from 
the speed skating ring) in the first part of the 2000s (Charmetant, 
2002; Terret, 2008). 
Lillehammer 1994: According to Chappelet’s (2003) overview of 
Olympic Winter Games legacy, the ski jumps have not been used 
regularly, whereas Hamar Hall (the ‘Viking ship’) has been satis-
factorily used for trade fairs, concerts and sport competitions. We 
will return to these commentary statements in the results of this 
paper.
Nagano 1998: According to Takao (2018), Nagano’s sport facilities 
are too huge and expensive to be maintained within the village 
 finances. Thus, it appears that local politicians and staff of sports 
associations planned the after-use of the facilities insufficiently. 
One example is a baseball stadium that was built for the opening 
and closing ceremonies. It remains empty (Zimbalist, 2015).
Salt Lake City 2002: Supporters of the 2002 Games publicly articu-
lated the argument that investing in sports facilities was intended 
to make Utah the ‘winter sports capital of North America’ and not 
merely a way to land the Games. Thus, even before SLC had a seri-
ous bid effort underway, the conditions were in place for conceptu-
alizing an Olympic legacy (Andranovich & Burbank, 2011). Overall, 
the 2002 Olympics created a legacy for the host city and state that 
is ultimately a political product. In part, this tangible legacy was a 
product of the commitment of public resources prior to securing 
the Games that led political leaders to create a rationale for the use 
of tax money and to articulate the need for a legacy before the IOC 
included this criterion. Furthermore, the state and city attempted 
to leverage the Games to continue to attract sporting events to the 
metropolis as part of the tourist mix. After the 2002 Games, area 
governments and local businesses created the Utah Sports Com-
mission to lure sports-related events to the state.
Torino 2006: The ski-jump complex in Pragelato and the bob-
sleigh track in Cesana have become ‘white elephants’ (Stimilli, 
Šæitaroci, & Sargolini, 2016). The two ice stadiums in Torre Pellice 
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at different levels, can be summed up in Lillehammer’s bid book to 
the IOC for the session in Seoul, Korea, September 1988: 
Lillehammer’s natural surroundings make it possible to con-
centrate all the events a very limited area. First, all athletes, 
coaches and managers will be assembled in one village in the 
heart of the Olympic area. Secondly, a number of sports arenas 
and other facilities will lie within walking distance of the Olym-
pic Village (Lillehammer Olympic Association, 1987a, p. 19).
A compact Games Model was a core of the strategy for the 1994 
Games, as it had been for the 1992 bid that failed. A prerequisite for 
applying for the Olympic Games is financial guarantees from the 
state authorities. One would expect that politicians at the national 
level saw a need to spread facilities over a larger area to secure a 
better after-use, or what would be a part of the legacy plan in to-
day’s Olympic project plan terminology. Instead, in its proposition 
to the government in 1985 (for the 1992 Games), the Ministry of 
Culture and Science narrowed itself to economic considerations: 
Economic reasons for increased proliferation can hardly be 
stated. Arena expenses make up only 1/6 of the estimated to-
tal costs [….] The probability is that increased diversification 
will increase rather than reduce total expenses, as any smaller 
expenses for arenas will be offset or exceeded by other infra-
structure costs (St. prp. nr. 85 (1984-1985)).
Later that same spring, the state guarantee was discussed in the 
Parliament. The discussion in the Parliament was marked by many 
statements and allegations, based on documents characterized 
by great uncertainty and lack of quality control. For example, the 
proposition to the Parliament in 1985 stated that the cost esti-
mates from the Lillehammer Municipality were ‘based on sketchy 
plans and rough costs’ (St. prp. nr. 85 (1984-1985), p. 4). This was re-
peated two years later when Lillehammer again applied for a state 
guarantee, this time for the 1994 Games. At the IOC Session in Lau-
sanne 1986, where Lillehammer was defeated by Albertville (and 
Sofia and Falun), the IOC decided to hold the Summer and Winter 
We have therefore supplemented the data with nine of these tran-
scribed interviews (including two prime ministers, three ministers 
of culture, two key politicians in the Parliament and the two lead-
ing people in Lillehammer’s bid committee).
This brings us to a point that may be raised with regards to the 
content and quality of the data. The fact that Lillehammer was 
awarded the Games more than 30 years ago may play in different 
directions. Regarding internal validity, the empirical story we tell as 
well as the analysis we make do not have internal discrepancies. It 
is therefore important to bear in mind that participants may have 
different experiences of what really happened. In that respect, we 
have to be aware that we may not get the full picture of all aspects 
of the case. The choice to conduct interviews with two key actors 
together more than 30 years after Lillehammer was awarded the 
Games was so they could correct each other with regard to mem-
ory. The interviews from 1990-91 are useful (also from a method-
ology viewpoint) as a supplement because they were conducted 
after the facilities were finally located and financed, but before it 
was known whether the Olympics would be successful.
Data was analysed using standard methods of exploring (Miles, 
Huberman, & Saldaña, 2014). We conducted a two-stage analysis. 
First, we concentrated on the following four points: Lillehammer’s 
venue planning in the bidding phase, different stakeholders’ in-
volvement, the involvement of the Parliament, and how the strate-
gies regarding sporting facilities post-Games influenced the lega-
cy until today. Second, based on the first stage, we discussed how 
the process fits in with today’s requirements regarding legacy and 
analytical frameworks. Our findings and discussion are presented 
in the following section.
Findings and discussion: 
The Lillehammer 1994 legacy 
To find an answer to how Lillehammer prepared for a positive 
legacy resulting from the huge investments in sporting facilities 
for Olympic Winter Games in 1994, our starting point is to pres-
ent how the sporting venues were located (picture to the right in 
 Figure 1) compared to how it was presented in the bid (left). As will 
be shown, the change in locations is probably one of the key as-
pects for a rather positive legacy. We divide this section into three 
phases by starting with the bid phase (1981-1988), continue with 
transformation after the Games was awarded in 1988, and then 
discuss the post-Games period. 
Phase 1: Local initiative – a compact and concentrated concept 
Lillehammer as a possible Olympic host was first presented to the 
Lillehammer Municipal Council in January 1982 (Lillehammer kom-
mune, 1982). The process for the next six years, including several 
working committees, investigations, political discussions and deci-
sions at the local and national level, and the promotion of the bid 
 
3 Both authors were involved in research on the policy process of the 1994 Lillehammer Games (not specific on legacy and facilities). 
Figure 1. Lillehammer’s venue concept in the bid and at the time 
of the Games. Distances: Lillehammer – Hamar (54 km), Lilleham-
mer – Kvitfjell (45 km).
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the financial obligations. These are with the host. This was clearly 
evident when the International Ice-Hockey Federation (IIHF) (sup-
ported by the Norwegian Ice Hockey Association) negotiated with 
the Lillehammer Olympic Organizing Committee (LOOC) about 
the ice hockey tournament. IIHF threatened to withdraw from the 
Games if new facilities were not built with an increase in spectator 
capacity of 50 per cent from the host contract (St. prp. nr. 1. Tillegg 
nr. 5 (1990-1991); St.prp. nr 1 (1990-1991)). Arne Myhrvold, vice 
president of the LOOC and the NOC, talked about the negotiations:
IIHF knew that they had the power to demand a lot from us. 
An Olympic Game without ice hockey was not an alternative. It 
gave an increase in expenditures but we had no choice. We sat 
also with the impression that the national special federation 
for ice hockey used IIHF’s power to secure legacy in the form of 
new facilities for Norwegian ice hockey after the Games (June 
2020 interview).
After hard negotiations, LOOC and IIHF came to an agreement 
which, among other things, entailed ice hockey’s exclusive use of 
Håkon Hall and Gjøvik Olympic Cavern Hall (matches and training), 
increase in spectator capacity, and an obligation to use the hall for 
ice hockey after the Games. Finally, LOOC (and not the IOC) paid 
IIHF a compensation of 1,2 mill USD (2,36 mill USD in 2020 value) 
because the tournament increased from 12 to 16 days (St. prp. nr. 
1. Tillegg nr. 5 (1990-1991)).
The huge increase in expenditure was a big concern for the Min-
istry of Culture. Without naming anyone, criticism was directed 
at the Lillehammer bid committee, the Lillehammer Municipal-
ity, sport organizations and the previous government for ‘…lack 
of identification or omission of costs; underestimation of costs 
and lack of assessment of the uncertainty in the project’ (St.prp. 
nr 1 (1990-1991), p. 12). In the spring of 1990, when the redefined 
concept was discussed in the Parliament (the new budget at 7 bil-
lion NOK was approved autumn the same year), it was proposed 
to move many venues out of the region. Among the moves were 
ski jump to the Holmenkollen in Oslo (200 km from Lillehammer), 
bobsleigh and luge to Oslo or re-use of the venue in Albertville, 
and downhill to ski resorts as Oppdal and Hemsedal, far away from 
the region (Stortinget, 1990). Another suggestion, stated by the 
government, was to change the concept of the downhill in Kvitfjell 
to a temporary venue. Many politicians were critical, but they knew 
that there was no way back. Therefore, they decided to increase 
the budget for sport venues to ensure the best possible after-use. 
Indoor ice rinks in Hamar and Gjøvik were approved, and all ven-
ues previously decided and suggested as temporary were set to be 
permanent. Kjell Borgen, a senior member of the Labour Party (A) 
and former cabinet minister in two ministries, was involved in the 
whole process. When the wide-ranging changes were approved in 
1990, he was the spokesperson for Olympic affairs in the parlia-
mentarian committee.
I did not believe my own eyes when I saw that we were to ar-
range the event that most people in the world see, namely 
alpine [downhill], using military trolleys and helicopters that 
would transport the skiers from the finish area in Ringebu and 
up to the top of the mountain. I also did not think it was possi-
Games in different years in a move aimed at focusing more atten-
tion on the winter events. For the new campaign, Lillehammer 
made just a few adjudgments in the concept. Almost all the sport 
facilities were located within a few kilometres in a town with less 
than 24  000 inhabitants. For example, four indoor ice rinks were 
planned in the Olympic Park, including two halls to be dismantled 
after the Games. One key venue was late in the 1992 campaign 
included in the concept: a downhill (only for men) at Kvitfjell, 45 
km north of Lillehammer.
To sum up phase 1 (the bidding): It was a local initiative with peo-
ple involved who saw this as a possibility for Lillehammer. As we 
will come back to, hardly any national politicians saw the project 
as realistic. With that perspective, it was easy to accept the prem-
ises (also regarding sports venues) without going into details. This 
should be changed.
Phase 2: National and international involvement
Lillehammer was awarded the 1994 Olympic Winter Games in 
September 1988 at the IOC session in Seoul, Korea. The host con-
tract was signed by the IOC, the Lillehammer Municipality and the 
Norwegian Olympic Committee, based on the venue plan and 
the concept Lillehammer presented in its campaign and at the 
IOC Session. As late as June 1987, the Parliament home in Norway 
had adopted a state guarantee on 1.78 bill NOK (3.753 billion in 
2020/0.35 bill. Euro). In 1990, the budget increased to 7 billion NOK 
(16.4 NOK in 2020 value/1.64 bill Euro). The sporting venue alone 
was estimated at 1.250 billion NOK (2.9 billion in 2020 value/0.29 
billion Euro) – almost three times higher than approved in the state 
guarantee for the bid (St.prp. nr 1 (1990-1991)).
It is typical that sport venues turn out to be much more expensive 
than estimated in the financial guarantee from the government 
in the bid phase (Flyvbjerg, 2011). The peculiarity of Lillehammer 
is that the whole concept was thoroughly changed. First, the ex-
tremely compact concept from the application was abandoned 
(Figure 1), something that can be seen as unfair to the competing 
bidders (Anchorage, Östersund and Sofia) because one of Lille-
hammer’s biggest advantages was its compactness. Second, al-
most all the facilities became larger and more expensive than what 
Lillehammer had presented a few years earlier (Table 1). To take 
two examples: An outdoor speedskating arena in Lillehammer was 
replaced by Hamar Olympic Hall, an iconic building constructed 
as a Viking ship turned upside down, with a capacity of 10  500 
spectators. Another example is one of the temporary ice halls in 
the Olympic Park, which was replaced by Gjøvik Olympic Cavern 
Hall, an ice rink with a capacity of 5300 located within a mountain. 
The cost explosion is classic in such projects (Alm, Solberg, Storm, & 
Jakobsen, 2016; Preuss, Andreff, & Weitzmann, 2019; Solberg & Pre-
uss, 2015). The Ministry of Culture’s proposition to the Parliament 
(about the 1994 Olympic budget) stated that the Olympic project 
had changed because of increase in the number of athletes, events 
and media representatives (St.prp. nr 1 (1990-1991)). One impor-
tant factor was new requirements from the international federa-
tions (IFs) to certify the facilities. IFs are responsible for organiz-
ing the competitions in their sports but have no responsibility for 
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Three of the Olympic venues have status as national venues: speed 
skating (the Viking ship) and alpine in Hafjell and Kvitfjell. Having 
status as a national venue means extra funding for investments 
(in addition to the after-use fund) from the Ministry of Culture as 
a post on the distribution of lottery money (Norwegian sport re-
ceives state funding mainly from the state-owned lottery). Also, 
cross-country skiing (Birkebeineren Ski Stadium), bobsleigh and 
luge (Hunderfossen), and the ski jump (Lysgaardsbakkene) are be-
ing maintained in accordance with international standards in the 
various international sport federations because of the after-use 
fund and extra funding from the state due to Lillehammer serving 
as host of the Youth Olympic Games in 2016 (Prop. 153 S (2010-
2011)). The facilities are regularly used for international competi-
tions. The figures covering the 25 years from 1993 to 2018 illustrate 
these: 32 World and European championships events in the Olym-
pic venues, as well as 129 World Cup events, 74 national champi-
onships, 162 national cups and 478 regional or mass sport events 
(LOLSC, 2019). Examples limited to 2019 and 2020: World Cup ski 
jumping (two times each winter), Nordic combine, cross-country 
skiing, luge, alpine (downhill, super-G) and European champion-
ship in speed skating. In 2021, Lillehammer will host the World Para 
Snow Sports Championships. All the venues for skiing are at the 
calendar for World Cup organized by the International Ski Federa-
tion (FIS) in the years to come.
Some of the arenas are (also) used for sports other than those for 
which they were built. For example, Håkons Hall (ice hockey in 
1994) has hosted the world championships in handball, European 
championships in taekwondo, and large festivals. Mainly, the fa-
cilities are used for training for both top athletes and recreational 
sports, including three handball surfaces that are used for many 
sports, a climbing wall, a running track, and a health club. Never-
theless, far cheaper facilities than an ice hockey hall with an audi-
ence capacity of 10,500 could have been built for these activities. 
Yet, without these costly arenas, Lillehammer would never have 
been awarded the Games. 
Other facilities are probably more in use for sport than expressed 
in the bidding phase and the first part of the post-Games phase. 
For example, in the 1980s, ski jumping was purely a winter sport, 
and the Lysgårdsbakkene was seen as a potential ‘white elephant’ 
as also indicated by Chappelet (2003) nine years after the Games. 
Due to a modernization of the big hill in 2007 (partly by the after-
use fund), which included snow production, artificial surfaces and 
other requirements, Lysgårsdbakkene is in use 12 months a year. 
The annual number of ski jumps is estimated to 100 000 (80 000 in 
the winter and 20 000 during the summer) (Olympiaparken, u.å).  
To sum up: More than 25 years after the Games, the construction 
portfolio has been well managed and used by the IOC (2013b) to 
show best practices. This is in contrast to many other former Olym-
pic cities whose arenas built for the Games have been abandoned 
and referred to as ‘white elephants’ in the event literature (Scheu et 
al., 2019). An obvious reason is the decisions taken by the national 
politicians in phase 2 by spreading the Olympic venues more than 
in the bidding phase, and to include a much larger after use fund. 
ble to take care of the environment through, for example, tem-
porary urinals and toilet facilities which would then be drained 
into cars and driven away in the dead of night. I think there was 
a lot here that did not seem very serious (April 1990 interview).
Borgen supported the local and regional interests, which from 
early on had directed their attention towards the after-use situa-
tion of the investments in new sport facilities. The establishment of 
an endowment fund for the post-Olympic period was one of their 
priorities. In the government guarantee before Lillehammer was 
awarded the Games, the fund was set to NOK 55 million (St. prp. 
nr. 87 (1986-1987)). With higher ambitions and new and more re-
alistic budgets, there was also a need for more generous grants for 
the post-Games period. With that background, the central govern-
ment established a model which should give incentives for such 
an increase. The mechanism established consisted of both a larger 
amount in the Olympic budget – as well as a share of expected 
extra incomes and untapped parts of the reserve fund which could 
be used for after-use purposes. 
In the end, the endowment fund in 1994 reached the level of about 
NOK 400 million. A relatively small part was used for investments in 
the years up to 1994 to improve the post-Games potentials of the 
venues. The remaining resources were divided into local funds and 
a regional one; the former transferred to the local owners of the 
new sport facilities and the latter directed for industrial develop-
ment, especially projects in the tourism sector.
To sum up: The decision to spread the facilities in several cities pro-
vided a basis for securing a positive legacy of the Olympic Games 
in Lillehammer. The involvement from major interests in sport and 
politics were far more comprehensive, and involved expertise from 
the national business community. The second factor was the es-
tablishment of a post-use fund that made it possible to ensure the 
maintenance and necessary upgrades of the facilities.
Phase 3: Lillehammer Post-Games 1994
At the end of the 1994 Games, 11 new sports facilities with a value 
of 1,25 billion NOK (2,2 billion NOK in 2020 value, 220 mill euro) 
remained (Langkaas, 1997). Included were four new ice halls, a ski 
jump (two hills), a speed-skating hall, bobsleigh and luge tracks, 
two slopes for alpine skiing, cross-country skiing/biathlon and an 
arena for freestyle skiing.
The operational responsibilities for the post-Games use of the new 
sport facilities have been transferred to the local level. The own-
ers of the venues are local municipalities when it comes to the 
arenas in the Lillehammer Olympic Park and Hamar and Gjøvik, 
respectively. The organization of these ownerships is through lim-
ited companies, established at arm’s length from the local govern-
ment’s ordinary activities. An exception from the public ownership 
is the alpine venues in Hafjell and Kvitfjell, which are owned by a 
private consortium today. After several changes in interest con-
stellations, today, the Alpinco Group is responsible for operating 
the venues on a commercial basis through a couple of companies, 
with Hafjell Kvitfjell Alpin Ltd. as the event organiser. 
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Planned or unplanned?
Going back to the legacy definition by Preuss (2007), the findings 
show that the sporting venues of the 1994 Olympic Winter Games 
in Lillehammer represent a positive and tangible legacy. But was 
it planned? The answer is in some ways ‘yes’, but what appears to 
be a planned, rigorous process for a positive facility legacy was 
not at all so in the bidding process, termed the Legacy concep-
tualization by Leopkey and Parent (2017). The local-based initia-
tors and politicians who processed and approved the application 
for a state guarantee before Lillehammer was awarded the Games 
did not plan for a (venue) legacy other than purely rhetorically and 
narrowed to the municipality of Lillehammer. If all the venues for 
sport on ice and snow (except the alpine disciplines) had been lo-
cated in a small town with 24 000 inhabitants in 1994, an obvious 
result would have been ‘white elephants’. Therefore, is it the case 
that Lillehammer has a positive legacy despite cursory planning 
in the initial phase and solely due to coincidences and more seri-
ous involvement of national stakeholders after Lillehammer was 
awarded the Games? The status of the Olympic sporting facilities, 
including a comparison of what was in the bid, Games time and 
the status today is summarized in Table 1.
By spreading the facilities to a much bigger regional area and in-
creasing the after-use fund, it has been possible to maintain the 
venues. A third factor, which may be seen as a surprise, is that the 
Parliament decided to choose a more expensive venue plan than 
needed when the final Olympic budget was approved in 1990. All 
sporting facilities planned as temporary were replaced by per-
manent venues. They chose architectural solutions, which meant 
iconic facilities that were more expensive than they needed to be. 
Examples of this are the ‘Viking Ship’ and the ‘Cavern Hall’ – two 
facilities that could have been built much cheaper if the politicians 
had wanted it. Instead, they choose extra investments in venues 
that would give TV viewers around the world an impression of 
modern Norway and be facilities that could benefit the local popu-
lation (not just for sports) in the future.
Sport Bid document 1988 Game time 1994 Status 2020
Alpine skiing Hafjell (18 km). All disciplines ex-
cept downhill and Super G
Kvitfjell (White Mountain) (45 km).
As in the bid
Hafjell Alpine Centre. 
Capacity: 30 000
Kvitfjell Alpine Centre. 
Capacity: 41 000
Annual World Cup (Kvitfjell), Junior 
Championships (Hafjell). Both are 
tourist destinations
Bobsleigh and luge Balberg (3 km) Hunderfossen Bobsleigh and Luge 
Track (15 km). 
Capacity: 10 000
Training and nat./int. competitions
Biathlon and Cross 
country
Faaberg, (5 km) Birkebeineren Ski Stadium, (3 km). 
Capacity biathlon: 13 500 
Capacity cross-country: 34 000
Biathlon: National competitions
Cross country: Annual World Cup 
and reg/nat. competitions. 
Figure skating Indoor ice rink in Lillehammer 
Olympic Park (1 km)
Capacity: 3000
Hamar Olympic Amphitheatre 
(54 km).
Capacity: 6000
Home venue of Storhamar Hockey, 
elite level
Freestyle skiing Not in the bid Kanthaugen Freestyle Arena (1 km).
Capacity: 15 000 
Used mainly for mass youth sport, 
sleighing and alpine 
Ice hockey Three indoor ice rinks in 
Lillehammer Olympic Park (in ad-
dition to the hall for figure skating 
also in use for ice-hockey (see 
above)
Capacity: 10 000, 700, 700 specta-
tors
Two indoor ice rinks in Lillehammer 
Olympic Park: Håkons Hall
Capacity: 10 500 
Kristin Hall (for training) 
Gjøvik Olympic Hall  45 km)
Capacity: 5300
Lillehammer: Håkons Hall for com-
petitions in various sport. Training 
for mass sport. Kristin Hall home 
venue of Lillehammer Hockey, elite 
level (cap 3500). 
Gjøvik: Ice-hockey and handball
Short track Not in the bid Hamar Olympic Amphitheatre
(54 km). See above (figure skating)
See above (ice-hockey)
Ski jumping Balberg (3 km) Lysgaardsbakkene Ski Jumping 
Arena. Also for opening/closing 
ceremony 
Capacity: 35 000
Annual World Cup men and 
 women. Artificial grass for summer 
ski jumping.
Speed skating Lillehammer Olympic Park (out-
door)
Hamar Olympic Hall (the Viking 
Ship) (54 km). 
Capacity: 10 600
Mass and elite sport. World 
 Championships
Table 1. Planned venues of the 1994 Olympic Winter Games in Lillehammer (Lillehammer Olympic Association, 1987b); how the venues 
were located (LOOC, 1995); and the status in 2020.
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cussion in the Parliament (Stortinget, 1990). In this debate, based 
on the proposition for venue localisations and new cost framework 
(St. prp. nr. 61 (1989-1990)), venues were a core element. It was 
suggestions that venues should be moved to existing facilities in 
other parts of Norway (also to re-use bobsleigh and luge in Albert-
ville). What ended up as a conclusion was to build new and more 
costly venues than planned by the local initiators, but not only in 
Lillehammer. This speech by Tore A. Liltvedt represents a majority 
of views:
The Mjøsa district will be the Olympic arena. This means a dis-
tribution in Lillehammer, Gjøvik, Hamar, Øyer and Ringebu. The 
distance between these different urban and rural municipali-
ties is very affordable […] I think the proposed arena locations 
provide a super mix. It gives the little extra not only during the 
Games, but also in terms of after-use. And the latter is not least 
important for people and business in this district (Stortinget, 
1990, p. 3067).
What seems from the debate in the Parliament is that the politi-
cians were less affected by the international federations than the 
Norwegian Confederation of Sports (NIF), which had an increas-
ingly important role. NIF supported the campaign in the bidding 
phase but did not at first engage in venue localisations, which was 
something they left to the National Olympic Committee. Accord-
ing to NIF president (1984-1990) Hans B. Skaset, the NIF board gave 
support to the idea but never took the question of Lillehammer as 
an Olympic host to the General Assembly. It was only in the deci-
sive phase before and during the IOC session in Seoul (1988) that 
NIF fully engaged. In the following two years, NIF was a key stake-
holder to move different venues to locations other than Lilleham-
mer – because of the after-use.
For us, it was important to ensure that the facilities would ben-
efit children’s and grassroots sports in addition to elite sport 
for many years after the Olympics. We would only be able to 
achieve this by using more cities than Lillehammer. Locally, 
there was great resistance, but eventually, the pressure was so 
great that Lillehammer municipality agreed to move some fa-
cilities (Hans B. Skaset, June 2020 interview).
The involvement by NIF, with the decisions that followed in the 
Parliament, is probably one of the keys to the positive legacy. An-
other is something pointed out by Alm et al. (2016); the formula 
for a successful venue investment seems simple, though: construct 
a new stadium in a place where a team that attracts large regular 
crowds already exists. Hamar and Lillehammer have teams at the 
elite level in ice hockey, which have regular use of the Hamar Olym-
pic Amphitheatre and Kristin Hall4. 
Time is an important consideration when discussing legacy. Bid-
ding cities often list long-term effects of the Olympics they them-
selves hardly believe and are not working to fulfil. Additionally, it 
takes many years to measure the true legacy of an event. As we 
have mentioned, Gratton and Preuss (2008) estimate this to be at 
least 15-20 years. One year after the 1994 Winter Games, Håkon 
Hall and bobsleigh and luge tracks would have had significant fi-
nancial challenges, had it not been for an after-use fund that was 
As shown by Leopkey and Parent (2017), a legacy process includes 
different actors, and they change during the event’s life cycle. The 
same authors emphasize that legacy planning should be part of 
the cycle from the conceptualisation phase to the post-Games 
phase. Initially, legacy planning should be about maximizing sup-
port from other Games stakeholders, including the public and the 
government/Parliament. As shown in the previous section, the 
Lillehammer idea obtained support early in the 1980s partly be-
cause some key stakeholders did not take the idea seriously. Many 
decision-makers hardly expected that there would be any Olym-
pics in Lillehammer, and therefore they did not take seriously what 
the initiators presented as positive outcomes. Some examples:
I must admit that it was difficult to get a picture of the extent 
to which this event would actually take place, and to what ex-
tent the state should commit itself financially. One can get the 
impression that the people of Lillehammer also knew less than 
they really should have known (Kåre Willoch, Prime Minister 
1981-1986, April 1991 interview).
I did not really reflect so much on the question because I did 
not take the matter seriously (Kjell Borgen, member of the Par-
liament. Later key spokesperson when the Parliament settled 
the new concept and budget in 1990. April 1991 interview). 
The commitment in the Parliament could seem modest. The 
Games was far in the future, and most felt that it would hardly 
be awarded to Norway even if one applied (Tore Liltvedt, Mem-
ber of Parliament. May 1991 interview).
Our analysis of the negotiations in the Parliament in 1985 (for 
the 1992 bid) shows that mainly local representatives and/or 
backbenchers were involved. Here, a backbencher is defined as a 
member of the Parliament who has no central position in his/her 
political party or in any committee in the Parliament. No ‘heavy-
weights’ (former/current ministers or people with key positions in 
their parties) were involved. Fifteen representatives (of 157) took 
part in the debate on May 22, 1985. Six of them were members 
representing Oppland (the host county). No representative from 
the neighbouring county, Hedmark (which ended up with two ice 
halls in Hamar), took part (Stortinget, 1985). The debate two years 
later (for the 1994 bid), though a few national politicians took the 
floor,  was mainly a repetition with little engagement. Prime minis-
ter Gro Harlem Brundtland, who had a key role in Seoul 1988, said: 
The case was perceived as a local initiative from Lillehammer 
where the nation was to give its support exclusively through a 
guarantee. Thus, it became the case in the Parliament that first 
and foremost the local representatives got involved (May 1991 
interview).
It may seem surprising that, back in the 1980s, an Olympic event 
was seen as something local that politicians from the area and 
backbenchers approved. This changed with the debate for a re-
vised concept after Lillehammer was awarded the Games. More 
profiled politicians with key roles in their parties took part, and 
representatives from 16 out of 19 counties participated in the dis-
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ning, but also for securing their long-term effects. Hence, legacy 
planning must include strategies to secure long-term funds for se-
curing positive legacy outcomes.
The sport venues built for the Lillehammer Olympics have experi-
enced a wide-ranging use for national and international competi-
tions in the post-Games period. The problem connected to ‘white 
elephants’ typically following large events did not occur. The un-
planned regionalisation of the sport venues, compared to the bid 
concept, in many ways facilitated easier post-Games responsibili-
ties for the host city. At the same time, the investments accelerated 
a legacy with better facilities for some sports. Due to more gen-
erous endowment funds than in the original plans, the Olympic 
park could develop in 20 years with a planned consumption of the 
fund’s capital. However, after 25 years and with empty funds, the 
challenges for the host are now substantial. The many sport events 
in the Olympic arenas have been a delight, of course, for the sport-
minded people in the region, while other citizen segments prefer 
different events and another public city profile. 
The example of Lillehammer’s legacy is opposite of what Thomson 
et al. (2013) stated in their literature review, claiming that planning 
for legacy must take place at the conception of the event, rather 
than being considered as an afterthought; ‘this means that legacy 
should be defined, responsibilities assigned, stakeholders identi-
fied, and strategies planned from the outset of the event’ (p. 120). 
The authors also point out something that seems obvious; legacy 
needs to be defined from the earliest stages of the event, so that 
event managers, policymakers, and stakeholders have a clear vi-
sion for what is to be achieved (p.120). For Lillehammer, the pro-
cess to fulfil the important legacy of the sporting facilities needed 
a complete change to have any possibility of being fulfilled. This 
happened years after the conception period started.
The case of Lillehammer will be interesting to follow in the years to 
come. For more than 25 years, the facilities have been taken care 
of – first and foremost with funding from the after-use fund. Now 
it is the responsibility of each municipality. Will they continue to 
finance the running costs (and necessary upgrading) of the ven-
ues with local taxpayers’ money? The conclusion of the story might 
change. 
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established, which generated approximately 400 million NOK 
(Heyerdahl, 2014). Annually, 12-13 million NOK have been spent 
on the facilities (8-10 m NOK in Lillehammer, and the rest to ven-
ues in Hamar, Gjøvik, Ringebu and to regional development in the 
Olympic region). In other words, what has been seen as a positive 
legacy has been dependent on considerable financial assistance. 
A Municipal Council representative from the Lillehammer Centre 
Party highlighted this in a recurring discussion on Lillehammer as 
Olympics host (for the Games in 2030 or 2034): ‘The necessity of ex-
traordinary state support (re-use funds) after the Olympics is in it-
self a proof that it is not profitable to organise the Olympic Games’ 
(Hoven, 2016). 
Most of the Olympic venues in the Lillehammer area are of too 
large a scale for ordinary local use. To keep the venues according 
to international standards, the owners are dependent on bringing 
activities into the venues to create income. Over the years, there 
has been a permanent endeavour to bring new events to the ven-
ues and a continuous run for large events – hopefully, one day also 
bringing the Olympics back to the region. Until today, however, it 
has been difficult to host international events with any surplus for 
the local organizers.
Preuss (2015) suggests that a positive perception of legacy can 
transform into a negative one and vice versa. He points to the ex-
ample of a new stadium that could initially produce a positive eco-
nomic legacy through increased tourism and the use of the arena 
for cultural events and other occasions. This, however, could turn 
into a negative legacy if the county or state does not financially 
support the facilities. This point is critical in the discussion around 
Lillehammer’s legacy. The after-use fund has been depleted, and 
government funding has ceased. The Lillehammer Municipality 
has absorbed a significant part of the financial burden, with con-
tributions from Oppland County and to some extent the state (na-
tional systems), but a protracted model has not been put in place. 
Concluding remarks
In this article, we conclude that the sport facilities after the Olym-
pics in Lillehammer left a positive legacy. The criteria for such a 
conclusion is that all the facilities are well maintained more than 
25 years later, and they are used for elite and mass sports. Regard-
ing the research question, how Lillehammer prepared for a positive 
legacy, the answer is less straightforward. In the initial phase, there 
was a lack of a thorough plan for sport venues. If the approved 
government’s guarantee and venue plan in 1987 had been up-
graded and not totally changed after Lillehammer was awarded 
the Games, , it is doubtful the legacy would have been entirely 
positive. 
The Parliament’s contribution to secure the building for the years 
to come was also a crucial part to ensure event legacy outcomes. 
What should be learned from the case of Lillehammer 1994 is that 
Olympic budgets must not only include a budget for legacy plan-
4 Kristin Hall has in 2020 a temporary name linked to a sponsor, Eidsiva Arena.
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